Reachability Analysis of Control Systems:

A Mixed Monotone Approach

Saber Jafarpour





September 11, 2024

Introduction







Power grids

Delivery drones

Autonomous Vehicles

- large penetration of distributed renewable units in power grids
- urban air mobility support operations including transfer of passengers and cargo
- the increase in number of self-driving learning-enabled vehicles

Introduction







Power grids

Delivery drones

Autonomous Vehicles


- large penetration of distributed renewable units in power grids
- urban air mobility support operations including transfer of passengers and cargo
- the increase in number of self-driving learning-enabled vehicles

Autonomous systems in our societies are becoming more **interconnected** and **complex**.

Safety and Robustness guarantees

A critical task

Desired performance while ensuring their safety and robustness.



2011 US Southwest blackout



Postal Drone hit the building




Self-driving car accident

Safety and Robustness guarantees

A critical task

Desired performance while ensuring their safety and robustness.







Postal Drone hit the building



Self-driving car accident

My Research

Provide guarantees for safety and robustness of autonomous systems

Tools: Systems and Control (contraction theory, monotone system theory)

Motivations and Applications

In this talk: Autonomous Systems with Learning-based components

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
Learning-based controllers or motion planners in safety-critical applications

Motivations and Applications

In this talk: Autonomous Systems with Learning-based components

- Learning-based controllers or motion planners in safety-critical applications
- Main reasons: computationally burdensome, executed by an expert, complicated representation.

Self driving vehicles: Recorded steering wheel angle Adjust for shat and rotation Last camera Rendom shift and rotation Right camera Basik propagation weight adjustment weight w





Collision avoidance:

ACAS Xu Command

1000

- Sheep Left Service Serv


M. Everett, et. al., IROS, 2018.

K. Julian, et. al., DASC, 2016.

M. Bojarski, et al., NeurIPS, 2016.

Safety verification and training


Goal: ensure *safety* of the closed-loop system



¹C. Szegedy et. al. Intriguing properties of neural networks. In ICLR, 2014


Safety verification and training

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Issues with learning algorithms:


- large # of parameters with nonlinearity
- sensitive wrt to input perturbations¹
- no safety guarantee in their training



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
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
- **1** Verification: how safe is the closed-loop system?
- **2** Training: how to design the learning component to ensure safety?

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Example: Safety in Mobile Robots


Learning-enabled controllers

Perception-based Obstacle Avoidance










Learning-based obstacle detection


trained offline using images



Example: Safety in Mobile Robots


Learning-enabled controllers

Perception-based Obstacle Avoidance





$$\dot{x} = f(x, u, w)$$
$$y = h(x)$$



Learning-based obstacle detection

trained offline using images


No guarantee to avoid the obstacle:

- out of distribution images
- changes in the environment

Example: Safety in Mobile Robots


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


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Goal

Outline of this talk

Reachability Analysis


Mixed Monotone Theory


Neural Network Controlled Systems

$$System: \dot{x} = f(x, w)$$

 $\mathsf{State}: x \in \mathbb{R}^n$

Uncertainty : $w \in \mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$







What are the possible states of the system at time T?

$$System: \dot{x} = f(x, w)$$

State : $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$

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What are the possible states of the system at time T?

• T-reachable sets characterize evolution of the system

$$\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) = \{x_w(T) \mid x_w(\cdot) \text{ is a traj for some } w(\cdot) \in \mathcal{W} \text{ with } x_0 \in \mathcal{X}_0\}$$


Safety verification via T-reachable sets

A large number of ${\bf safety}$ ${\bf specifications}$ can be represented using T-reachable sets


Safety verification via T-reachable sets

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• Example: Reach-avoid problem



$$\mathcal{R}_f(T,\mathcal{X}_0,\mathcal{W}) \cap \text{ Unsafe set } = \emptyset$$




$$\mathcal{R}_f(T_{\mathrm{final}}, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \mathsf{Target}$$
 set


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
$$\mathcal{R}_f(T_{\mathrm{final}}, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \mathsf{Target}$$
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Combining different instantiation of Reach-avoid problem \Longrightarrow diverse range of specifications (complex planning using logics, invariance, stability)

Applications


Autonomous Driving:






Althoff, 2014

Robot-assisted Surgery:






Power grids:



Chen and Dominguez-Garcia, 2016

Drug Delivery:



Chen, Dutta, and Sankaranarayanan, 2017

Why is it difficult?

Computing the T-reachable sets are computationally challenging

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Solution: over-approximations and under-approximation of reachable sets

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Solution: over-approximations and under-approximation of reachable sets

ullet for safety verification \Longrightarrow over-approximations

Over-approximation: $\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \overline{\mathcal{R}}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W})$


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
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$$\overline{\mathcal{R}}_f(T,\mathcal{X}_0,\mathcal{W}) \cap \mathsf{Unsafe} \; \mathsf{set} = \emptyset$$



$$\overline{\mathcal{R}}_f(T_{\mathrm{final}}, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \mathsf{Target} \ \mathsf{set}$$

Run-time Reachability

Definition and Motivations

In many autonomous systems safety cannot be **completely ensured** at the design level².

²Institute for Defense Analysis, The Status of Test, Evaluation, Verification, and Validation of Autonomous Systems, 2018

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Reasons:

- Impossible to completely characterize behavior of the system (human-in-the-loop)
- Lead to conservative design (stochastic environments)
- Simpler design with computationally efficiency (learning-based controllers)

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Run-time reachability: In these applications, we need to compute reachable sets in run-time to verify safety of the system

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Literature review

Reachability of dynamical system is an old problem: $\sim 1980\,$

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Different approaches for approximating reachable sets

- Bisimulations
- Linear, and piecewise linear systems (Ellipsoidal methods)
- Polynomial systems (Sum of Square)
- Optimization-based approaches (Hamilton-Jacobi, Level-set method)

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In this talk: a mathematically rigorous and computationally efficient approach for run-time reachability

Outline of this talk

Reachability Analysis

Mixed Monotone Theory

Neural Network Controlled Systems

Monotone Dynamical Systems

Definition and Characterization

A dynamical system $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$ is monotone³if

$$x_u(0) \le y_w(0)$$
 and $u \le w \implies x_u(t) \le y_w(t)$ for all time

where \leq is the component-wise partial order.

³Angeli and Sontag, "Monotone control systems", IEEE TAC, 2003

Monotone Dynamical Systems


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Monotone Dynamical Systems

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
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Monotonicity test

- $\frac{\partial f}{\partial w}(x,w) \ge 0$



In this talk: monotone system theory for reachability analysis

³Angeli and Sontag, "Monotone control systems", IEEE TAC, 2003

Reachability of Monotone Dynamical Systems

Hyper-rectangular over-approximations

Theorem (classical result)

For a monotone system with $\mathcal{W} = [\underline{w}, \overline{w}]$

$$\mathcal{R}_f(t, [\underline{x}_0, \overline{x}_0]) \subseteq [x_{\underline{w}}(t), x_{\overline{w}}(t)]$$

where $x_{\underline{w}}(\cdot)$ (resp. $x_{\overline{w}}(\cdot)$) is the trajectory with disturbance \underline{w} (resp. \overline{w}) starting at \underline{x}_0 (resp. \overline{x}_0)

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
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Example:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_2^3 - x_1 + w \\ x_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathcal{W} = \begin{bmatrix} 2.2, 2.3 \end{bmatrix} \quad \mathcal{X}_0 = \begin{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} -0.5 \\ -0.5 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 \\ 0.5 \end{bmatrix} \end{bmatrix}$$



Non-monotone Dynamical Systems

Reachability analysis

 For non-monotone dynamical systems the extreme trajectories do not provide any over-approximation of reachable sets

Non-monotone Dynamical Systems


Reachability analysis

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Embedding into a higher dimensional system

- Key idea: embed the dynamical system on \mathbb{R}^n into a dynamical system on \mathbb{R}^{2n}
- ullet Assume $\mathcal{W}=[\underline{w},\overline{w}]$ and $\mathcal{X}_0=[\underline{x}_0,\overline{x}_0]$

Original system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, w)$$

Embedding system

$$\underline{\dot{x}} = \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w}),
\dot{\overline{x}} = \overline{d}(x, \overline{x}, w, \overline{w})$$

$\underline{d}, \overline{d}$ are decomposition functions s.t.

- 2 cooperative: $(\underline{x},\underline{w}) \mapsto \underline{d}(\underline{x},\overline{x},\underline{w},\overline{w})$
- $\textbf{ ompetitive: } (\overline{x},\overline{w}) \mapsto \underline{d}(\underline{x},\overline{x},\underline{w},\overline{w})$
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- **3** competitive: $(\overline{x}, \overline{w}) \mapsto \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$
- ullet the same properties for \overline{d}

The embedding system is a monotone dynamical system on \mathbb{R}^{2n} with respect to the **southeast** partial order \leq_{SE} :

$$\begin{bmatrix} x \\ \widehat{x} \end{bmatrix} \leq_{\mathrm{SE}} \begin{bmatrix} y \\ \widehat{y} \end{bmatrix} \quad \iff \quad x \leq y \quad \text{and} \quad \widehat{y} \leq \widehat{x}$$

Versatility and History

ullet f locally Lipschitz \Longrightarrow a decomposition function exists

The best (tightest) decomposition function is given by

$$\underline{d}_i(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w}) = \min_{\substack{z \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}], z_i = x_i \\ u \in [\underline{w}, \overline{w}]}} f_i(z, u), \qquad \overline{d}_i(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w}) = \max_{\substack{z \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}], z_i = \overline{x}_i \\ u \in [\underline{w}, \overline{w}]}} f_i(z, u)$$

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A short (and incomplete) history:

J-L. Gouze and L. P. Hadeler. Monotone flows and order intervals. Nonlinear World, 1994

G. Enciso, H. Smith, and E. Sontag. Nonmonotone systems decomposable into monotone systems with negative feedback . Journal of Differential Equations, 2006.

H. Smith. Global stability for mixed monotone systems. Journal of Difference Equations and Applications, 2008

Embedding System for Linear Dynamical System

A structure preserving decomposition

• Metzler/non-Metzler decomposition: $A = [A]^{Mzl} + |A|^{Mzl}$

• Example:
$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & -1 \\ 1 & -3 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \implies \lceil A \rceil^{\text{Mzl}} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & -3 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \qquad \lfloor A \rfloor^{\text{Mzl}} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$[A]^{Mzl} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$


Linear systems


Original system

$$\dot{x} = Ax + Bw$$

Embedding system

$$\underline{\dot{x}} = [A]^{\text{Mzl}} \underline{x} + [A]^{\text{Mzl}} \overline{x} + B^{+} \underline{w} + B^{-} \overline{w}
\dot{\overline{x}} = [A]^{\text{Mzl}} \overline{x} + [A]^{\text{Mzl}} \underline{x} + B^{+} \overline{w} + B^{-} \underline{w}$$





Reachability using Embedding Systems

Hyper-rectangular over-approximations


Theorem⁴

Assume $\mathcal{W}=[\underline{w},\overline{w}]$ and $\mathcal{X}_0=[\underline{x}_0,\overline{x}_0]$ and

$$\underline{\dot{x}} = \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w}), \qquad \underline{x}(0) = \underline{x}_0$$

$$\dot{\overline{x}} = \overline{d}(\overline{x}, \underline{x}, \overline{w}, \underline{w}), \qquad \overline{x}(0) = \overline{x}_0$$

Then $\mathcal{R}_f(t,\mathcal{X}_0)\subseteq [\underline{x}(t),\overline{x}(t)]$



⁴Coogan and Arcak, "Efficient finite abstraction of mixed monotone systems", HSCC, 2015.

Reachability using Embedding Systems

Hyper-rectangular over-approximations


Theorem⁴

Assume $\mathcal{W}=[\underline{w},\overline{w}]$ and $\mathcal{X}_0=[\underline{x}_0,\overline{x}_0]$ and

$$\underline{\dot{x}} = \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w}), \qquad \underline{x}(0) = \underline{x}_0$$

$$\dot{\overline{x}} = \overline{d}(\overline{x}, \underline{x}, \overline{w}, \underline{w}), \qquad \overline{x}(0) = \overline{x}_0$$

Then
$$\mathcal{R}_f(t,\mathcal{X}_0)\subseteq [\underline{x}(t),\overline{x}(t)]$$



(Scalable) a single trajectory of embedding system provides **lower bound** (\underline{x}) and **upper bound** (\overline{x}) for the trajectories of the original system.

⁴Coogan and Arcak, "Efficient finite abstraction of mixed monotone systems", HSCC, 2015.

Original System:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_2^3 - x_2 + w \\ x_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathcal{W} = \begin{bmatrix} 2.2, 2.3 \end{bmatrix} \quad \mathcal{X}_0 = \begin{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} -0.5 \\ -0.5 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 \\ 0.5 \end{bmatrix} \end{bmatrix}$$

blue = cooperative, red = competitive

Decomposition function

$$\underline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w}) = \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x}_2^3 + \underline{w} \\ \underline{x}_1 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -\overline{x}_2 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$
$$\overline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w}) = \begin{bmatrix} \overline{x}_2^3 + \overline{w} \\ \overline{x}_1 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -\underline{x}_2 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

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
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Embedding System:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x}_1 \\ \underline{x}_2 \\ \overline{x}_1 \\ \overline{x}_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x}_2^3 - \overline{x}_2 + \underline{w} \\ \underline{x}_1 \\ \overline{x}_2^3 - \underline{x}_2 + \overline{w} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{w} \\ \overline{w} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 2.2 \\ 2.3 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \underline{x}_1(0) \\ \underline{x}_2(0) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -0.5 \\ -0.5 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \overline{x}_1(0) \\ \overline{x}_2(0) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 \\ 0.5 \end{bmatrix}$$



Outline of this talk

Reachability Analysis

Mixed Monotone Theory

Neural Network Controlled Systems

Safety Verification

Given the open-loop nonlinear system with a neural network controller

$$\dot{x} = f(x, u, w),$$

$$u = N(x),$$

study reachability of the closed-loop system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), w) := f^c(x, w)$$

Safety Verification

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
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u=N(x) is k-layer feed-forward neural net $\xi^{(i)}(x)=\phi^{(i)}(W^{(i-1)}\xi^{(i-1)}(x)+b^{(i-1)})$ $x=\xi^{(0)},\ \ u=W^{(k)}\xi^{(k)}(x)+b^{(k)}:=N(x),$



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
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u = N(x) is k-layer feed-forward neural net

$$\begin{split} \xi^{(i)}(x) &= \phi^{(i)}(W^{(i-1)}\xi^{(i-1)}(x) + b^{(i-1)}) \\ x &= \xi^{(0)}, \ \ u = W^{(k)}\xi^{(k)}(x) + b^{(k)} := N(x), \end{split}$$



Challenge: directly performing reachability on f^c is complicated

N(x) is high dimensional and has a large # of parameters

A Compositional Approach

Reachability of open-loop system treating \boldsymbol{u} as a parameter

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Reachability of open-loop system treating \boldsymbol{u} as a parameter


Neural network verification algorithm for bounds on \boldsymbol{u}

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
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Reachability of open-loop system + Neural network verification bounds








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Reachability of open-loop system + Neural network verification bounds



If not carefully implemented, it can lead to overly-conservative results

In this talk: how to suitably define this composition

Mixed Monotone Reachability of Open-loop System

A Jacobian-based decomposition function

Jacobian-based: $\dot{x}=f(x,u)$ such that $\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}\in[\underline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]},\overline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}]$ and $\frac{\partial f}{\partial u}\in[\underline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]},\overline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]}]$, then

$$\begin{bmatrix} \underline{\underline{d}}(\underline{x},\overline{x},\underline{\underline{u}},\overline{\underline{u}}) \\ \overline{\underline{d}}(\underline{x},\overline{x},\underline{\underline{u}},\overline{\underline{u}}) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -[\underline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}]^- & [\underline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}]^+ \\ -[\overline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}]^+ & [\overline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{\underline{x}} \\ \overline{\underline{x}} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -[\underline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]}]^- & [\underline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]}]^- \\ -[\overline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]}]^+ & [\overline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{\underline{u}} \\ \overline{\underline{t}} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} f(\underline{x},\underline{u}) \\ f(\underline{x},\underline{u}) \end{bmatrix}$$

⁵Harapanahalli, Jafarpour, Coogan. "A Toolbox for Fast Interval Arithmetic in numpy with an Application to Formal Verification of Neural Network Controlled Systems", 2nd WFVML, ICML, 2023

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 Interval arithmetic allows computing Jacobian bounds efficiently.

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
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- Interval arithmetic allows computing Jacobian bounds efficiently.
- npinterval⁵: Toolbox that implements intervals as native data-type in numpy.



$$[x_2^2 + 2x_1x_2 + x_2^2, 4\sin(x_1/4)\cos(x_2/4) - 4\cos(x_1/4)\sin(x_2/4)]^T$$

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Interval Bounds for Neural Networks

Neural Network Verification Algorithms

Input-output bounds: Given a neural network controller u=N(x)

$$\underline{u}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} \leq N(x) \leq \overline{u}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}, \quad \text{ for all } x \in [\underline{x},\overline{x}]$$

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Neural network verification algorithms can produce these bounds (CROWN, LipSDP, IBP, etc)

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
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CROWN⁶

- Bounding the value of each neurons
- Linear upper and lower bounds on the activation function





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A naive compositional approach

Dynamics of bicycle

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{p_x} &= v \cos(\phi + \beta(u_2)) & \dot{\phi} &= \frac{v}{\ell_r} \sin(\beta(u_2)) \\ \dot{p_y} &= v \sin(\phi + \beta(u_2)) & \dot{v} &= u_1 \\ \beta(u_2) &= \arctan\left(\frac{l_r}{l_f + l_r} \tan(u_2)\right) \end{aligned}$$






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Goal: steer the bicycle to the origin avoiding the obstacles


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 \bullet train a feedforward neural network $4\mapsto 100\mapsto 100\mapsto 2$ using data from model predictive control


Case Study: Bicycle Model

- ullet start from (8,8) toward (0,0)
- $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \overline{x}_0]$ with

$$\underline{x}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 7.95 & 7.95 & -\frac{\pi}{3} - 0.01 & 1.99 \end{pmatrix}^{\top}$$

 $\overline{x}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 8.05 & 8.05 & -\frac{\pi}{3} + 0.01 & 2.01 \end{pmatrix}^{\top}$

CROWN for verification of neural network



Embedding system:

$$\underline{\dot{x}} = \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{\mathbf{u}}, \overline{\mathbf{u}}, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$$

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$$\underline{\mathbf{u}} \leq N(x) \leq \overline{\mathbf{u}}$$
, for every $x \in [\underline{x}, \overline{x}]$.


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
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


Euler integration with step h:

$$\underline{x}_1 = \underline{x}_0 + h\underline{d}(\underline{x}_0, \overline{x}_0, \underline{u}_0, \overline{u}_0, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$$
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
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
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Euler integration with step h:

$$\underline{x}_2 = \underline{x}_1 + \underline{h}\underline{d}(\underline{x}_1, \overline{x}_1, \underline{u}_1, \overline{u}_1, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$$
$$\overline{x}_2 = \overline{x}_1 + \underline{h}\overline{d}(\underline{x}_1, \overline{x}_1, \underline{u}_1, \overline{u}_1, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$$

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
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



Euler integration with step h:

$$\underline{x}_3 = \underline{x}_2 + h\underline{d}(\underline{x}_2, \overline{x}_2, \underline{u}_2, \overline{u}_2, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$$

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 $\underline{u_2} \leq N(x) \leq \overline{u_2}$, for every $x \in [\underline{x_2}, \overline{x_2}]$.





Issues with the compositional approach

Neural network controller as **disturbances** (worst-case scenario) It does not capture the **stabilizing** effect of the neural network.

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An illustrative example

 $\dot{x} = x + u + w$ with controller u = -Kx, for some unknown $1 < K \le 3$.

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Naive interconnection approach

First find the bounds $u \leq Kx \leq \overline{u}$, then

This system is unstable.

Interaction approach

First replace u = Kx in the system, then

$$\underline{\dot{x}} = (1 - \underline{K})\underline{x} + \underline{w}
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We need to know the **functional** dependencies of neural network bounds

Functional Bounds for Neural Networks

Function Approximation

Functional bounds: Given a neural network controller u = N(x)

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• Example: CROWN⁷can provide functional bounds.

CROWN functional bounds:

$$\begin{split} & \underline{N}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}(x) = \underline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}x + \underline{b}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}, \\ & \overline{N}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}(x) = \overline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}x + \overline{b}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} \end{split}$$

CROWN input-output bounds:

$$\begin{split} &\underline{u}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} = \underline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}^+ \overline{x} + \overline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}^- \underline{x} + \underline{b}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}, \\ &\overline{u}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} = \overline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}^+ \overline{x} + \underline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}^- \underline{x} + \overline{b}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} \end{split}$$

⁷Zhang, Weng, Chen, Hsieh, Daniel. "Efficient neural network robustness certification with general activation functions." NeurIPS. 2018.

Interaction Approach

A pictorial explanation

Original system:

$$\frac{\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), w)}{\text{closed-loop system}}$$

Embedding system:

$$\longrightarrow \begin{bmatrix} \underline{\dot{x}} \\ \overline{\dot{x}} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \underline{\underline{H}}_{+}^{+} - \underline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} & \underline{\underline{H}}_{-}^{-} \\ \overline{\underline{H}}_{+}^{+} - J_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} & \overline{\underline{H}}_{-}^{-} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x} \\ \overline{x} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -[\underline{J}_{[\underline{w},\overline{w}]}^{-}]^{-} & [\underline{J}_{[\underline{w},\overline{w}]}^{-}]^{+} \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{w} \\ \overline{w} \end{bmatrix} + Q$$

$$\text{closed-loop embedding system}$$

How does the interaction approach work?

- Closed-loop decomposition function = Jacobian based for f(x, N(x), w).
- Neural Network affine functional bounds

$$\begin{array}{l} \underline{N}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} = \underline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}x + \underline{b}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]},\\ \overline{N}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} = \overline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}x + \overline{b}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}\\ \text{are used to compute the interactions.} \end{array}$$

Systems with NN Controllers

Interaction Approach

Theorem⁸

Let
$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \in [\underline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]},\overline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}]$$
, $\frac{\partial f}{\partial u} \in [\underline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]},\overline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]}]$, and $\frac{\partial f}{\partial w} \in [\underline{J}_{[\underline{w},\overline{w}]},\overline{J}_{[\underline{w},\overline{w}]}]$. Then

$$\begin{bmatrix} \underline{d}_i^c(\underline{x},\overline{x},\underline{w},\overline{w}) \\ \overline{d}_i^c(\underline{x},\overline{x},\underline{w},\overline{w}) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} [\underline{\boldsymbol{H}}]^+ - \underline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} & [\underline{\boldsymbol{H}}]^- \\ [\overline{\boldsymbol{H}}]^+ - \overline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} & [\overline{\boldsymbol{H}}]^- \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x} \\ \overline{x} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -[\underline{J}_{[\underline{w},\overline{w}]}]^- & [\underline{J}_{[\underline{w},\overline{w}]}]^+ \\ -[\overline{J}_{[\underline{w},\overline{w}]}]^- & [\overline{J}_{[\underline{w},\overline{w}]}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{w} \\ \overline{w} \end{bmatrix} + Q$$

where

$$\frac{\underline{H}}{\underline{H}} = \underline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} + [\underline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]}]^{+} \underline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} + [\underline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]}]^{-} \overline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}$$

$$\overline{\underline{H}} = \overline{J}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} + [\underline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]}]^{+} \overline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]} + [\underline{J}_{[\underline{u},\overline{u}]}]^{-} \underline{A}_{[\underline{x},\overline{x}]}$$

is a decomposition function for the closed-loop system.

⁸ Jafarpour, Harapanahalli, Coogan. "Efficient Interaction-aware Interval Reachability of Neural Network Feedback Loops", arXiv, 2003


Numerical Experiments


- start from (8,7) toward (0,0)
- $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \overline{x}_0]$ with


$$\underline{x}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 7.95 & 6.95 & -\frac{2\pi}{3} - 0.01 & 1.99 \end{pmatrix}^{\top}$$

 $\overline{x}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 8.05 & 7.05 & -\frac{2\pi}{3} + 0.01 & 2.01 \end{pmatrix}^{\top}$

CROWN for verification of neural network







Conclusions

and follow-up work

- Reachability as a framework for safety certification
- Mixed monotone theory as a computationally efficient method for reachability
- Reachability of neural network controlled systems
- Capture the interaction between system and neural network controller

Follow-up work: Forward invariance (safety guarantees for infinite time)

Harapanahalli, Jafarpour, and Coogan. Forward Invariance in Neural Network Controlled Systems. arXiv, Sep 2023