

Safety Assurance in Neural Network-Controlled Systems:

A Mixed Monotone Approach

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University of Colorado **Boulder**

Workshop on Formal Verification of Control Systems with Neural Network Components, ACC 2025

Acknowledgment



Akash Harapanahalli
Georgia Tech



Samuel Coogan
Georgia Tech

SJ and A. Harapanahalli and S. Coogan. [Interval Reachability of Nonlinear Dynamical Systems with Neural Network Controllers](#). L4DC, 2023.

SJ and A. Harapanahalli and S. Coogan. [Efficient interaction-aware interval analysis of neural network feedback loops](#). IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2024

A. Harapanahalli and SJ and S. Coogan. [immrax: A Parallelizable and Differentiable Toolbox for Interval Analysis and Mixed Monotone Reachability in JAX](#). ADHS 2024

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Motivations and Success Stories

Increase in deployment of learning components in autonomous systems

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Motivations and Success Stories

Increase in deployment of learning components in autonomous systems

- availability of data and computation tools
- performance and efficiency

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Motivations and Success Stories

Increase in deployment of learning components in autonomous systems


- availability of data and computation tools
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Success stories and potential applications

Self-driving vehicles



Manufacturing



Fulfillment center



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
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
Learning-enabled systems are often deployed in **safety-critical** environments

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety Assurance as a Challenge

But can we ensure their safety?

Waymo driverless car strikes bicyclist in San Francisco, causes minor injuries



Robot accident at Amazon warehouse renews safety debate

Written by Faluke Dasu
Published on Dec. 10, 2018




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
What is special about Learning-based components?

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

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


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- highly sensitive to input perturbations




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
Amazon warehouse robots 'increase staff injuries'

30 September 2020

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- highly sensitive to input perturbations
- large # of parameters with nonlinearity



$$478 \times 100 \times 100 \times 10$$


of parameters ~ 90000
of activation patterns $\sim 10^{60}$

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MIT
Technology
Review

- highly sensitive to input perturbations
- large # of parameters with nonlinearity
- limited guarantee in their design

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

The way we train AI is fundamentally flawed

The process used to build most of the machine-learning models we use today can't tell if they will work in the real world or not—and that's a problem.

By Will Douglas Heaven


November 18, 2020

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
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Scalable and **computationally efficient** methods for safety assurance


Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Safety in Machine Learning

ML focus on safety and robustness of **stand-alone** learning algorithms




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Different approaches:

- analysis ([Goodfellow et al., 2015](#), [Zhang et al., 2019](#), [Fazlyab et al., 2023](#))
- design ([Papernot et al., 2016](#), [Carlini and Wagner, 2017](#), [Madry et al., 2018](#))

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


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In autonomous systems, learning algorithms are **a component of the system**
(controller, motion planner, obstacle detection)

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
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New challenges arises when learning algorithms are used **in-the-loop**

Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Learning-based Feedback Controllers

- **In this talk:** Learning-based component is a controller





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Goal: Ensure safety of the closed-loop system





Learning-enabled Autonomous Systems

Learning-based Feedback Controllers

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Safety of learning-based controlled systems using **reachability analysis**

- Safety via Reachability Analysis
- Mixed Monotone Reachability
- Neural Network-Controlled Systems



Reachability Analysis of Systems

Problem Statement

System : $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$

State : $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$

Uncertainty : $w \in \mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$



What are the possible states of the system at time T ?



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What are the possible states of the system at time T ?

- **T -reachable sets** characterize evolution of the system

$$\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) = \{x_w(T) \mid x_w(\cdot) \text{ is a traj for some } w(\cdot) \in \mathcal{W} \text{ with } x_0 \in \mathcal{X}_0\}$$

Reachability Analysis of Systems

Safety verification via T -reachable sets


A large number of **safety specifications** can be represented using reachable sets

Reachability Analysis of Systems


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- Example: Reach-avoid problem



$$\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \cap \text{Unsafe set} = \emptyset$$




$$\mathcal{R}_f(T_{\text{final}}, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \text{Target set}$$

Reachability Analysis of Systems


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Combining different instantiation of Reach-avoid problem $\implies$
diverse range of specifications
(complex planning using logics, invariance, stability)

Reachability Analysis of Systems

Why is it difficult?

Computing **exact** reachable sets are computationally challenging

Reachability Analysis of Systems

Why is it difficult?

Computing **exact** reachable sets are computationally challenging

Solution: over-approximations of reachable sets

Over-approximation: $\mathcal{R}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq \overline{\mathcal{R}}_f(T, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W})$


Reachability Analysis of Systems

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
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
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
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In this talk: computationally efficient methods for over-approximating reachable sets

- Safety via Reachability Analysis
- Mixed Monotone Reachability
- Neural Network-Controlled Systems


Monotone Dynamical Systems

Definition and Characterization

A dynamical system $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$ is monotone if

$$x_u(0) \leq y_w(0) \quad \text{and} \quad u \leq w \quad \implies \quad x_u(t) \leq y_w(t) \quad \text{for all time}$$

where $\leq$ is the component-wise partial order.



²D. Angeli and E. Sontag, "Monotone control systems", TAC 2003

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
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Kamke–Müller condition¹

A dynamical system $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$ is monotone iff

- 1 $\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(x, w)$ is Metzler (off-diag ≥ 0) for all x, w
- 2 $\frac{\partial f}{\partial w}(x, w) \geq 0_{n \times m}$ for all x, w



²D. Angeli and E. Sontag, “Monotone control systems”, TAC 2003

Monotone Dynamical Systems

Generalization to partial orders

A dynamical system $\dot{x} = f(x, w)$ is monotone if

$$x_u(0) \preceq_K y_w(0) \quad \text{and} \quad u \preceq_C w \quad \implies \quad x_u(t) \preceq_K y_w(t) \quad \text{for all time}$$


where $\preceq_K$ ($\preceq_C$) is the partial order with induced by the cone K (C).

A **polyhedral cone** has the form

$$K = \underbrace{\{y \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid H_K y \geq 0_p\}}_{\text{halfspace rep}} = \underbrace{\{V_K y \mid y \geq 0_p\}}_{\text{vertex rep}}$$

Kamke–Müller condition²

- ① $H_K \left(\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(x, w) + \alpha(x, w) I_n \right) V_K \geq 0_p$ for some $\alpha(x, w)$
- ② $H_K \frac{\partial f}{\partial w}(x, w) V_C \geq 0_q$



²SJ and S. Coogan, “Monotonicity and Contraction on Polyhedral Cones”, TAC 2024.

Reachability of Monotone Systems

Hyper-rectangular over-approximations

Theorem (classical)³

For a monotone system with $\mathcal{W} = [\underline{w}, \overline{w}]$

$$\mathcal{R}_f(t, [\underline{x}_0, \overline{x}_0], [\underline{w}, \overline{w}]) \subseteq [x_{\underline{w}}(t), x_{\overline{w}}(t)]$$

where $x_{\underline{w}}(\cdot)$ (resp. $x_{\overline{w}}(\cdot)$) is the trajectory with disturbance $\underline{w}(\cdot)$ (resp. $\overline{w}(\cdot)$) starting at $\underline{x}_0$ (resp. $\overline{x}_0$)

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
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Example:

$$\frac{d}{dt} \begin{bmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} x_2^3 - x_1 + w \\ x_1 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathcal{W} = [2.2, 2.3] \quad \mathcal{X}_0 = \left[\begin{bmatrix} -0.5 \\ -0.5 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} 0.5 \\ 0.5 \end{bmatrix} \right]$$



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
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does not hold for non-monotone systems

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Mixed Monotone Theory

Stability using Monotonicity

- **Key idea:** embed the dynamical system on $\mathbb{R}^n$ into a dynamical system on $\mathbb{R}^{2n}$
- Assume $\mathcal{W} = [\underline{w}, \overline{w}]$ and $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \overline{x}_0]$

Original system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, w)$$

Embedding system

$$\dot{\underline{x}} = \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w}),$$

$$\dot{\overline{x}} = \overline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$$

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$\underline{d}, \overline{d}$ are **decomposition functions** s.t.

- ① $f(x, w) = \underline{d}(x, x, w, w)$ for every x, w
- ② **cooperative:** $(\underline{x}, \underline{w}) \mapsto \underline{d}_i(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$
- ③ **competitive:** $(\overline{x}, \overline{w}) \mapsto \underline{d}_i(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$
- ④ the same properties for $\overline{d}$

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The embedding system is a monotone dynamical system on $\mathbb{R}^{2n}$ with respect to the **southeast** partial order $\leq_{\text{SE}}$:

$$\begin{bmatrix} x \\ \widehat{x} \end{bmatrix} \leq_{\text{SE}} \begin{bmatrix} y \\ \widehat{y} \end{bmatrix} \iff x \leq y \quad \text{and} \quad \widehat{y} \leq \widehat{x}$$

In terms of cones, $\leq_{\text{SE}}$ is induced by the cone $\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n \times -\mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n$.

Mixed Monotone Theory

Stability using Monotonicity

- **Key idea:** embed the dynamical system on $\mathbb{R}^n$ into a dynamical system on $\mathbb{R}^{2n}$
- Assume $\mathcal{W} = [\underline{w}, \overline{w}]$ and $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \overline{x}_0]$

Original system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, w)$$

Embedding system

$$\begin{aligned}\dot{\underline{x}} &= \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w}), \\ \dot{\overline{x}} &= \overline{d}(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w})\end{aligned}$$

$\underline{d}, \overline{d}$ are **decomposition functions** s.t.

- ① $f(x, w) = \underline{d}(x, x, w, w)$ for every x, w
- ② **cooperative:** $(\underline{x}, \underline{w}) \mapsto \underline{d}_i(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$
- ③ **competitive:** $(\overline{x}, \overline{w}) \mapsto \underline{d}_i(\underline{x}, \overline{x}, \underline{w}, \overline{w})$
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Computing decomposition function:

- close connection with **inclusion function** in Numerical Analysis⁴
- **Jacobian-based:** mean-value inequality and interval arithmetic⁵

^dL. Jaulin, et al. "Applied Interval Analysis", 2001 [Book]

^eA. Harapanahalli, **SJ**, S. Coogan, "A toolbox for fast interval arithmetic in Numpy", 2023

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In this talk: mixed monotone theory for reachability analysis


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⁶S. Coogan and M. Arcak, “Efficient finite abstraction of mixed monotone systems”, TAC 2015.


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
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(Computational efficient): solve for one trajectory of embedding system

(Scalable): embedding system is $2n$ -dimensional

⁶S. Coogan and M. Arcak, “Efficient finite abstraction of mixed monotone systems”, TAC 2015.

- Safety via Reachability Analysis
- Mixed Monotone Reachability
- Neural Network-Controlled Systems

Safety of NN-Controlled Systems

Problem Statement


An open-loop nonlinear system with a Neural Network (NN) controller

$$\dot{x} = f(x, u, w),$$

$$u = N(x),$$

safety of the closed-loop system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), w) := f^c(x, w)$$



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
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
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directly performing reachability on f^c is computationally challenging

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
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Compositional Approach

Combine MM reachability with **neural network verification algorithms**

Safety of NN-Controlled Systems

Literature Review of reachability approaches

Linear Systems:

- M. Everett, et al. [Reachability analysis of neural feedback loops](#), IEEE Access, 2021
- H. Hu, et al. [Reach-SDP: Reachability analysis of closed-loop systems with neural network controllers via semidefinite programming](#), CDC, 2020

Nonlinear Systems:

- N. Rober, et al. [Backward reachability analysis of neural feedback loops: Techniques for linear and nonlinear systems](#), OJCSYS, 2023
- C. Sidrane, et al. [OVERT: An algorithm for safety verification of neural network control policies for nonlinear systems](#), JMLR, 2022.
- C. Huang, et al. [ReachNN: Reachability analysis of neural-network controlled systems](#), TECS, 2019
- R. Ivanov, et al. [Verisig 2.0: Verification of neural network controllers using taylor model preconditioning](#), CAV, 2021
- C. Huang, et al. [POLAR: A polynomial arithmetic framework for verifying neural-network controlled systems](#), ATVA, 2022
- C. Schilling, et al. [Verification of neural-network control systems by integrating Taylor models and zonotopes](#), AAI, 2022

Compositional Approach

Combine MM reachability with **neural network verification algorithms**

Compositional Approach

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Input-output bounds: Given a neural network controller $u = N(x)$

$$\underline{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}, \quad \text{for all } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$$

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Many neural network verification algorithms can produce such bounds, including:

- Lipschitz-based estimates ([Combettes et al., 2019](#)),
- convex relaxation bounds ([H. Zhang et al., 2018](#)),
- interval arithmetics ([S. Gowal et al., 2018](#)),
- polyhedral bounds ([M. Fazlyab et al., 2019](#))




Embedding System for NN Controlled Systems

A Compositional Approach

Reachability of open-loop system treating u as a parameter

Neural network verification algorithm for bounds on u

Reachability of open-loop system + Neural network verification bounds



Embedding System for NN Controlled Systems

A Compositional Approach




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Embedding System for NN Controlled Systems

A Compositional Approach

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


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


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It lead to overly-conservative estimates of reachable set



Stabilizing Effects

Issues with the Input-output over-approximations

Neural network controller as **disturbances** (worst-case scenario)
It does not capture the **stabilizing** effect of the neural network.

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$\dot{x} = x + u + w$ with controller $u = -Kx$, for some unknown $1.5 = \underline{K} \leq K \leq \overline{K} = 3$.

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$$\dot{\underline{x}} = \underline{x} + \underline{u} + \underline{w}$$

$$\dot{\overline{x}} = \overline{x} + \overline{u} + \overline{w}$$

This system is unstable.

Functional bounds

First replace $u = Kx$ in the system, then

$$\dot{\underline{x}} = (1 - \overline{K})\underline{x} + \underline{w}$$

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We need to know the **functional** dependencies of neural network bounds

New Perspective toward NN Verifiers

Function Approximation

Functional bounds: Given a neural network controller $u = N(x)$

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
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CROWN verification algorithm

- Bounding the value of each neurons
- Linear upper and lower bounds on the activation function



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CROWN functional bounds:

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CROWN input-output bounds:

$$\begin{aligned}\underline{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} &= \underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^+ \bar{x} + \underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^- \underline{x} + \underline{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}, \\ \overline{u}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} &= \overline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^+ \bar{x} + \overline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}^- \underline{x} + \overline{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}\end{aligned}$$

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Evolution of the system on $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$:

$$\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), w)$$

where $\underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}x + \underline{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \leq N(x) \leq \overline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}x + \bar{b}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}$

Embedding System for NN Controlled Systems

Functional Approach

Evolution of the system on $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$:

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Embedding System for NN Controlled Systems

Functional Approach

Evolution of the system on $[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]$:

$$\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), \underbrace{w}_{\text{disturbance}})$$

where

$$\underbrace{\underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}x}_{\text{stabilizing term}} + \underbrace{\underline{b}}_{\text{disturbance}} \leq N(x) \leq \underbrace{\bar{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}x}_{\text{stabilizing term}} + \underbrace{\bar{b}}_{\text{disturbance}}$$

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Reachability analysis: treat $\underline{b}$ and w as disturbances and $\underline{A}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}x$ as a part of the system to obtain a decomposition function

Embedding System for NN Controlled Systems

Functional Approach

Theorem⁸

Original system

$$\dot{x} = f(x, N(x), w)$$

Embedding system

$$\begin{bmatrix} \dot{x} \\ \dot{w} \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} [\underline{H}]^+ - \frac{J_{[x,x]}}{J_{[x,x]}} & [\underline{H}]^- \\ [\overline{H}]^+ - \frac{J_{[x,x]}}{J_{[x,x]}} & [\overline{H}]^- \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x \\ w \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -[J_{[w,w]}]^- & [J_{[w,w]}]^+ \\ -[J_{[w,w]}]^- & [J_{[w,w]}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} w \\ w \end{bmatrix} + Q$$

$\underline{H}$ and $\overline{H}$ capture the stabilizing interactions between nonlinear system and neural network.

⁸SJ and A. Harapanahalli and S. Coogan, "Efficient interaction-aware interval analysis of neural network feedback loops", TAC, 2024

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Functional over-approximation: $\mathcal{R}_{fc}(t, \mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{W}) \subseteq [\underline{x}(t), \bar{x}(t)]$

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Computational aspects

- one trajectory of $2n$ -dim embedding system (fast using integration methods)
- implement NN verification algorithm per time-step (fast using CROWN)

⁸SJ and A. Harapanahalli and S. Coogan, "Efficient interaction-aware interval analysis of neural network feedback loops", TAC, 2024

Case Study: Vehicle Platooning


Obstacle Avoidance

Dynamics of the j th vehicle

$$\dot{p}_x^j = v_x^j, \quad \dot{v}_x^j = \tanh(u_x^j) + w_x^j,$$

$$\dot{p}_y^j = v_y^j, \quad \dot{v}_y^j = \tanh(u_y^j) + w_y^j,$$

where $w_x^j, w_y^j \sim \mathcal{U}([-0.001, 0.001])$.



Unsafe

Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

Obstacle Avoidance

Dynamics of the j th vehicle


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where $w_x^j, w_y^j \sim \mathcal{U}([-0.001, 0.001])$. First vehicle uses a neural network controller

$4 \times 100 \times 100 \times 2$, with ReLU activations

and is trained using trajectory data from an MPC controller for the first vehicle.



Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

Obstacle Avoidance

Dynamics of the j th vehicle


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$$u_d^j = k_p \left(p_d^{j-1} - p_d^j - r \frac{v_d^{j-1}}{\|v^{j-1}\|_2} \right) + k_v (v_d^{j-1} - v_d^j),$$

where $d \in \{x, y\}$.



Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

Obstacle Avoidance


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Safety: platoon avoids the obstacle

Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

Obstacle Avoidance


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- Input-output bounds
- a platoon of 9 vehicles
- reachable over-approximations for $t \in [0, 1.5]$



Case Study: Vehicle Platooning

Obstacle Avoidance

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
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- **Functional bounds**
- a platoon of 9 vehicles
- reachable over-approximations for $t \in [0, 1.5]$

N (units)	# of states	Our Approach (s)	POLAR (s)	JuliaReach (s)
4	16	1.369	14.182	12.579
9	36	3.144	43.428	59.929
20	80	9.737	316.337	—
50	200	46.426	4256.435	—

Table: Run-time comparison



POLAR = C. Huang et al., ATVA 2022

JuliaReach = C. Schilling et al., AAI 2022

Conclusions and Future Directions

Key takeaways

- ① reachability as a framework for safety certification of autonomous systems
- ② computationally efficient approach for reachability using mixed monotone theory
- ③ compositional approach for verification of neural network-controlled systems
- ④ capture stabilizing effect of learning-based components

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- **stochastic systems**: capture the effect of stochastic noise in NN-controlled systems

Thank you for your attention!

Back up Slides

How to compute a decomposition function for a system?

How to compute a decomposition function for a system?

Different approaches for constructing decomposition functions

- linear systems
- polynomial systems

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Every **locally Lipschitz** system has at least one decomposition function

Mixed Monotone Theory

Computing of decomposition functions

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
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$$\underline{d}_i(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{w}, \bar{w}) = \min_{\substack{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}], z_i = \underline{x}_i \\ u \in [\underline{w}, \bar{w}]}} f_i(z, u),$$

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Mixed Monotone Theory

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
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obtaining this decomposition function is computationally complicated.

Interval-based Reachability

A Jacobian-based decomposition function

How to compute a decomposition function for a system?

Interval-based Reachability

A Jacobian-based decomposition function

How to compute a decomposition function for a system?

- Assume $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is scalar:

Mean-value Inequality

$$f(\underline{x}) + \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right] (\bar{x} - \underline{x}) \leq f(x) \leq f(\underline{x}) + \left[\max_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right] (\bar{x} - \underline{x})$$

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Punchline

sign pattern of $\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}$ separates **cooperative** and **competitive** effect of states.

Interval-based Reachability

A Jacobian-based decomposition function

How to compute a decomposition function for a system?

Theorem⁹

Jacobian-based: $\dot{x} = f(x, u)$ such that $\frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \in [J_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}, \bar{J}_{[\underline{x}, \bar{x}]}]$ and $\frac{\partial f}{\partial u} \in [J_{[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]}, \bar{J}_{[\underline{u}, \bar{u}]}]$, then

$$\begin{bmatrix} \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u}) \\ \bar{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u}) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} -[\underline{M}]^- & [\underline{M}]^- \\ -[\underline{M}]^+ & [\underline{M}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{x} \\ \bar{x} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} -[\underline{N}]^- & [\underline{N}]^- \\ -[\underline{N}]^+ & [\underline{N}]^+ \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \underline{u} \\ \bar{u} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} f(\underline{x}, \underline{u}) \\ f(\bar{x}, \bar{u}) \end{bmatrix}$$

$\underline{x} \mapsto R_1 \mapsto R_2 \mapsto \dots \mapsto R_n \mapsto \bar{x}$, then the i -th column of $\underline{M}$ is $\min_{z \in R_i, w \in [\underline{u}, \bar{u}]} \frac{\partial f_i}{\partial x}(z, w)$

⁴SJ and A. Harapanahalli and S. Coogan, Efficient interaction-aware interval analysis of neural network feedback loops, TAC, 2023

Interval-based Reachability

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
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- Interval analysis for computing Jacobian bounds.
- Use tools and techniques from interval analysis.



⁴SJ and A. Harapanahalli and S. Coogan, Efficient interaction-aware interval analysis of neural network feedback loops, TAC, 2023

Embedding System for Linear Dynamical System

A structure preserving decomposition

- **Metzler/non-Metzler** decomposition: $A = \lceil A \rceil^{\text{Mzl}} + \lfloor A \rfloor^{\text{Mzl}}$


- Example: $A = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & -1 \\ 1 & -3 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \lceil A \rceil^{\text{Mzl}} = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & -3 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$

$$\lfloor A \rfloor^{\text{Mzl}} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & -1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Linear systems

Original system


$$\dot{x} = Ax + Bw$$



Embedding system

$$\dot{\underline{x}} = \lceil A \rceil^{\text{Mzl}} \underline{x} + \lfloor A \rfloor^{\text{Mzl}} \bar{x} + B^+ \underline{w} + B^- \bar{w}$$

$$\dot{\bar{x}} = \lceil A \rceil^{\text{Mzl}} \bar{x} + \lfloor A \rfloor^{\text{Mzl}} \underline{x} + B^+ \bar{w} + B^- \underline{w}$$



Interval-based Reachability

Proof of Jacobian-based Theorem

For a scalar vector field $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$, we show that $d(\underline{x}, \bar{x}) = f(\underline{x}) + \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- (\bar{x} - \underline{x})$ is

① cooperative in $\underline{x}$

② competitive in $\bar{x}$

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \underline{x}} d(\underline{x}, \bar{x}) = \frac{\partial}{\partial \underline{x}} f(\underline{x}) - \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- = \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \Big|_{x=\underline{x}} - \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- \geq 0.$$

Similarly,

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \bar{x}} d(\underline{x}, \bar{x}) = \left[\min_{z \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}]} \frac{\partial f}{\partial x} \right]^- \leq 0$$

Case Study: Bicycle Model



A naive compositional approach

Dynamics of bicycle

$$\dot{p}_x = v \cos(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{\phi} = \frac{v}{\ell_r} \sin(\beta(u_2))$$

$$\dot{p}_y = v \sin(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{v} = u_1$$

$$\beta(u_2) = \arctan\left(\frac{\ell_r}{\ell_f + \ell_r} \tan(u_2)\right)$$



Case Study: Bicycle Model



A naive compositional approach

Dynamics of bicycle

$$\dot{p}_x = v \cos(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{\phi} = \frac{v}{\ell_r} \sin(\beta(u_2))$$

$$\dot{p}_y = v \sin(\phi + \beta(u_2)) \quad \dot{v} = u_1$$

$$\beta(u_2) = \arctan\left(\frac{\ell_r}{\ell_f + \ell_r} \tan(u_2)\right)$$



Goal: steer the bicycle to the origin avoiding the obstacles

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
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Goal: steer the bicycle to the origin avoiding the obstacles

- train a feedforward neural network $4 \mapsto 100 \mapsto 100 \mapsto 2$ using data from model predictive control

Reachability of Closed-loop System

Case Study: Bicycle Model


- start from $(8, 8)$ toward $(0, 0)$

- $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$ with

$$\underline{x}_0 = \left(7.95 \quad 7.95 \quad -\frac{\pi}{3} - 0.01 \quad 1.99 \right)^\top$$

$$\bar{x}_0 = \left(8.05 \quad 8.05 \quad -\frac{\pi}{3} + 0.01 \quad 2.01 \right)^\top$$

- CROWN for verification of neural network



Embedding system:

$$\dot{\underline{x}} = \underline{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u}, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\dot{\bar{x}} = \bar{d}(\underline{x}, \bar{x}, \underline{u}, \bar{u}, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\underline{u} \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}, \text{ for every } x \in [\underline{x}, \bar{x}].$$

Reachability of Closed-loop System

Case Study: Bicycle Model


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- CROWN for verification of neural network





Euler integration with step h :

$$\underline{x}_1 = \underline{x}_0 + h \underline{d}(\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0, \underline{u}_0, \bar{u}_0, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\bar{x}_1 = \bar{x}_0 + h \bar{d}(\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0, \underline{u}_0, \bar{u}_0, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\underline{u}_0 \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}_0, \text{ for every } x \in [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0].$$



Reachability of Closed-loop System

Case Study: Bicycle Model


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


Euler integration with step h :

$$\underline{x}_2 = \underline{x}_1 + h \underline{d}(\underline{x}_1, \bar{x}_1, \underline{u}_1, \bar{u}_1, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\bar{x}_2 = \bar{x}_1 + h \bar{d}(\underline{x}_1, \bar{x}_1, \underline{u}_1, \bar{u}_1, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\underline{u}_1 \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}_1, \text{ for every } x \in [\underline{x}_1, \bar{x}_1].$$



Reachability of Closed-loop System

Case Study: Bicycle Model


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



Euler integration with step h :

$$\underline{x}_3 = \underline{x}_2 + h \underline{d}(\underline{x}_2, \bar{x}_2, \underline{u}_2, \bar{u}_2, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\bar{x}_3 = \bar{x}_2 + h \bar{d}(\underline{x}_2, \bar{x}_2, \underline{u}_2, \bar{u}_2, \underline{w}, \bar{w})$$

$$\underline{u}_2 \leq N(x) \leq \bar{u}_2, \text{ for every } x \in [\underline{x}_2, \bar{x}_2].$$



Case Study: Bicycle Model

Numerical Experiments



- start from $(8, 7)$ toward $(0, 0)$

- $\mathcal{X}_0 = [\underline{x}_0, \bar{x}_0]$ with


$$\underline{x}_0 = \left(7.95 \quad 6.95 \quad -\frac{2\pi}{3} - 0.01 \quad 1.99 \right)^\top$$

$$\bar{x}_0 = \left(8.05 \quad 7.05 \quad -\frac{2\pi}{3} + 0.01 \quad 2.01 \right)^\top$$

- CROWN for verification of neural network



Naive interconnection approach



interaction approach